Abstract TCP-based flooding attacks are a common form of Distributed Denial-of-Service 4 (DDoS) attacks which abuse network resources and can bring about serious threats to the Internet.
Most existing defense schemes against IP spoofing focus on random spoofing. One example 48 is to limit the chance of random IP spoofing by filtering at the routers. Implementing ingress 49 and egress filtering at the border routers is one specific realization of this approach. At the 50 upstream interface, the ingress filter should only allow source addresses within a valid range
51
(usually corresponding to the same subnet), thus preventing spoofed traffic from being sent 52 to the Internet. Unfortunately, this method does not work for subnet spoofing. Implementing 53 encryption and authentication can also reduce the spoofing threats. In fact, both measures are 54 already included in IPv6 to eliminate the spoofing threats. However, the current Internet still uses
55
IPv4 as the dominant communication protocol.
56
To defend against spoofed flooding traffic, especially that with subnet spoofing, we propose a 57 scheme that is based on a storage-efficient data structure and a change-point detection method.
58
The storage-efficient data structure, which is a variant of Bloom filter [2] , is used to gener-59 ate a hash digest of the traffic. The change-point detection method is based on the CUSUM 60 algorithm [3] , which is a nonparametric change-point detection method. CUSUM enjoys the 61 virtues of sequential and nonparametric test and its computational requirement is quite low.
62
After some information about the traffic is extracted and stored in the Bloom filter, CUSUM is 63 then applied to detect abnormal changes in the digested traffic. packets to improve the attack efficiency [14] . These packets will not trigger the third round of 110 a handshake. Figure 1 (b) shows the scenario under random IP spoofing. Most connections will 111 not receive the second round of each handshake because the ACK/SYN packets are sent to other 112 subnets. Under subnet spoofing as shown in Fig. 1(c) , however, ACK/SYN packets are sent to the 113 correct subnet but destined to an incorrect host. The third round of a handshake is not successful. 114 Thus, a major difference between random spoofing and subnet spoofing is the different return 115 paths of the ACK/SYN packets. The figure for fixed spoofing is ignored since the effect is similar 116 to that of subnet spoofing.
117
Another difference between random spoofing and subnet spoofing is that random spoofing has 118 a much wider range of IPs than subnet spoofing. Random spoofing generates 32-bit IP addresses 119 randomly, and hence the probability of generating the same IP address twice is very small. On 120 the other hand, since the IP addresses in subnet spoofing are restricted to the range of a subnet, 121 it is not unusual to find that quite a large number of attacking packets have the same spoofed 122 source IP address. As a result, although both random spoofing and subnet spoofing give rise to 123 many incomplete handshakes, the incomplete handshakes caused by subnet spoofing have more 124 repeated source IPs. of each handshake. If any one of the rounds is lost, it is regarded as an incomplete handshake.
127
We use the first and third rounds because both of them belong to the outgoing traffic. A study existence of an element from some address space A. Given an element a ∈ A, the bits at positions Fig. 2(a) ). Note that a particular bit may be set to 1 to replace the n bits, as shown in Fig. 2 
The n counters in each row correspond to addresses from 0 to n − 
181
When a SYN request packet, corresponding to the first round of a handshake, is captured in 182 the outgoing traffic, the destination IP of the SYN packet is hashed using the k independent hash 183 functions and the corresponding counters in T d hit by the k hash functions are incremented by 184 α where 0 < α ≤ 1. Meanwhile, another hash table T s works in the same way but records the 185 source IP information. The source IP of the SYN packet is hashed into the source table T s and 186 the corresponding counters are updated.
187
When an ACK packet, corresponding to the third round of a handshake, is captured in the 188 outgoing traffic, both the destination and source IPs are extracted again and hashed into T d and 189 T s , respectively. This time the corresponding counters are decremented by α where 0 < α ≤ 1. 190 For a normal TCP handshake, both SYN and ACK are observed and hence the corresponding 191 counters are first incremented and then decremented by α, leading to no resulting changes. 192 Figure 3 summarizes how tables T d and T s are used.
193
All entries in both tables T d and T s are reset periodically to prevent them from growing 194 indefinitely when it is under attack. Suppose R t−1 is the value of a counter at time t − 1. Its value 195 is reset to R t at time t as follows:
Although it is possible that two different IP addresses are mapped to the same counter in a 197 row, the probability that they get mapped to the same counters in all k (k ≥ 1) rows is very low 198 even for a small value of k. As a result, the false positive rate caused by hash collision is rather 199 P1: aaa legitimate packet hits the suspicious counters in all k rows is equal to
Since l i n, the probability P that a legitimate packet is misclassified as a suspicious one 
Construction of hash functions

205
Having a good set of independent hash functions is essential for good hash table performance.
206
Ideally, each hash function in the Bloom filter should hash the keys to the table uniformly and
207
two different keys should have low probability of collision. Moreover, the k hash functions are 208 independent.
209
In practice, it is not easy to design a good hash function that distributes the keys uniformly and 210 yet has low computational cost. Moreover, the distribution of input keys affects the distribution
211
of the counter usage. The design of such hash functions will be studied in our future work.
212
In this paper, we focus on the design of independent hash functions that have low probability
213
of collision. We use the 32-bit IP address IP as the key of the hash functions. The hash functions 214 are defined as follows:
where mod denotes the modulus operation, n is the row length of the hash table, and p i is a prime 216 number less than n.
217
We now discuss the condition that makes two different keys collide in all k hash functions,
218
i.e., for 
This condition is strict for two keys IP 1 = IP 2 to satisfy h i (IP 1 ) = h i (IP 2 ) for all k hash functions. 222 Thus we can conclude that the false positive rate should be very low.
223
The row length n of the hash table is chosen to be a power of 2. This choice allows the 224 modulus operation to be applied by simple bit masking which is computationally much cheaper 225 than performing the division operation.
4 Detection mechanism 227
During a spoofed flooding attack, it is expected that many incomplete handshakes will be observed 228 and hence there are many more SYN packets than the corresponding ACK packets. As a result, 229 some counters in T d will have an abnormally high counter value. Under normal operation, these 230 counter values should be close to 0. So there should exist a change point from low to high counter 231 values when an attack is launched.
232
In this section, we address the problem of detecting change points in the probabilistic char-233 acteristics of random sequences. Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) is a sequential detection method 234 which assumes that the mean value of some variable under surveillance will change from nega-235 tive to positive value whenever a change occurs. In our case, CUSUM is applied to detect abrupt 236 changes in T d . After a packet is identified as suspicious, we analyze its source IP and classify it 237 into one of three categories: random, subnet or fixed spoofing. 
Change-point detection method
239
There exist two major change-point detection methods: posteriori change-point detection method 240 and sequential change-point detection method. When the process of data acquisition is completed 241 at the moment of checking, it is called a posteriori change-point method. On the other hand, the 242 sequential method checks for change points online with observations, i.e., simultaneously with 243 the process of data acquisition. The sequential method is preferred in spoofed attacking traffic 244 since it works in an online manner.
245
The essence of sequential change-point detection is as follows. Suppose the observations of 246 a random process X t (with discrete or continuous time) are received sequentially. At a certain 247 moment (random or not, but unknown), some probabilistic characteristics of this process change. 248 An observer must make a decision as quickly as possible as to whether a change-point has 249 happened or not, while keeping the false alarm rate to be as low as possible.
250
Suppose that a sequence X 1 , . . . , X r of independent random variables is observed. 
The CUSUM statistic g r = S r − min 0≤ j≤r S j can be written in the following recurrent form:
where a + = a I (A) for some a ≥ 0 and I (A) is the characteristic function of the set A.
258
The effectiveness of this statistic is easy to understand. The mathematical expectation of
is negative before and positive after the change-point.
260
The stopping rule for change-point detection is:
where b > 0 is the alarm threshold.
262
There is a nonparametric version of the CUSUM statistic:
and the corresponding decision rule is
where I (·) is the indicator function and N is the threshold. d N is the decision at time r , which
265
gives a value of 1 to indicate an attack and 0 to indicate a normal condition.
266
In general, E(X r ) = c. We choose a parameter a as the upper bound of c, i.e., a > c. Then we 267 define x r = X r − a so that it has a negative value during normal operation. When an attack takes 268 place, the increase rate will suddenly become larger and the value x r = X r − a will be positive. 
Sequence model
270
Modeling of TCP connection requests is a difficult problem and the sequence X t is not easily 271 defined. It is not easy to devise a simple parametric model for TCP traffic due to its complicated 272 characteristics. However, we assume that when an attack occurs, the traffic distribution will be 273 different from that of normal traffic. We select the nonparametric version of CUSUM to perform 274 online change-point detection, which has low computational cost.
275
Since the k rows in T d are independent of each other, we choose one row to discuss for clarity.
276
There are n counters in each row of 
The density function of sequence {C t i } will change and CUSUM will detect this change. We 284 define x t i = C t i − a, where a > 0, as the sequence of time t for the CUSUM method. The two 285 parameters are set according to the network conditions. Generally, the parameter a is close to 286 0 since the counter value should be close to 0 when there exist no spoofed flooding attack and 287 network error. Thus x t i has a negative value under normal operation. When a spoofed flooding 288 attack occurs, it will change to a positive value. As for the parameter N which defines the alarm 289 threshold, a large value leads to longer detection delay but lower false positive rate.
290
When a spoofed flooding attack occurs, each row is expected to have a counter with an 291 abnormally high value. These abnormal counters are referred to as heavy counters. If a packet 292 is hashed into T d and hits all the k heavy counters in all k rows, this packet is regarded as a 293 suspicious spoofed packet and hence an alarm will be launched. 
Spoofing type classification and response
295
No matter what type of IP spoofing is used, packets can be detected with our change-point 296 detection method. We can then identify the spoofing type by analyzing its source IP.
297
Since random spoofing generates a wide range of IP addresses for the source IPs of the packets, 298 the probability that two packets have the same source IP is very low. On the other hand, subnet 299 spoofing has a much narrower range than random spoofing. During a spoofed flooding attack, 300 the attacking source typically generates a large number of packets. This number is much larger 301 than the number of candidate IP addresses used for subnet spoofing. For example, in order to 302 bring down a victim server for 10 minutes, the attacker needs to inject at least 300,000 SYN 303 packets [17] . However, a class C subnet only has 254 IP addresses which are available for a 304 subnet spoofing attack. Therefore, quite a number of subnet spoofed packets are expected to 305 have identical source IPs during the attack period.
306
We define two thresholds, θ 1 and θ 2 (1 < θ 1 < θ 2 ), for T s . When a packet hits k heavy counters 307 in T d , its source IP is checked in T s . If all counters in T s hit by this packet have values larger than 308 θ 1 but smaller than θ 2 , it is regarded as subnet spoofing. If the value is much larger than θ 2 , it may 309 be caused by fixed spoofing. Otherwise it is regarded as random spoofing. Another difference 310 between random spoofing and subnet spoofing is the degree of overlap of the IP addresses. With 311 random spoofing, the IP addresses hashed into the same counter are typically different as a result 312 of hash collisions. With subnet spoofing, however, the IP addresses hashed into the same counter 313 are usually the same. This difference can be used for distinguishing random spoofing from subnet 314 spoofing.
315
Random spoofing may be throttled by ingress filters deployed at the edge routers. However, 316 there has been a lack of efficient methods for fighting against subnet spoofing. To defend against 317 attacks caused by fixed spoofing and subnet spoofing, we propose here a soft rate-limiting scheme. 318 Specifically, the percentage of traffic to go through is equal to
where C s is the value of a counter in T s and γ, ε are parameters. The legitimate value of C s is 320 0. Thus if C s is close to 0, we essentially allow almost all traffic to pass through. According to 321 the classification scheme above, a higher value of C s means that the traffic has a higher chance 322 of being packets caused by fixed spoofing. The larger the value of C s is, the more traffic will 323 be blocked. A lower value means that the traffic is more likely due to subnet spoofing. A small 324 rate-limiting value is thus used to mitigate collateral damages since the traffic is more distributed 325 and more legitimate traffic may hit these counters.
326
P1 the k different independent hash functions in the Bloom filter. In our comparative study, we set 351 n to 1024, k to 4, and the 100,000 IP addresses are randomly generated. These IP addresses are 352 inserted into the hash tables for different hash functions.
U N C O R R E C T E D P R O O F
353
The execution time and the number of collisions for each hash function are shown in Table 1 .
354
It can be seen that our hash function not only has the lowest (zero) collision rate like Robert's P1: aaa 
364
In all the experiments, the number of rows k in each hash table is set to 4 and the number of 365 counters n in each row is set to 1024. For attack detection, we only need to monitor the destination 366 table T d . As before, since each row in T d corresponds to an independent hash function, we only 367 discuss any one row here as other rows are the same.
368
We first observe the status of T d during normal operation. The parameters a and N are set to 369 different values for our testing. Normal traffic begins at 21:00 on one day and ends at 18:32 on 370 the following day. There are a total of 27877 TCP connections during this period. The numbers 371 of false positives observed for different combinations of the parameters a and N are shown in 372 Table 2 . Compared to a total of 27877 connections, the number of false positives is actually 373 quite small and tolerable. We observe that most of the counters have a zero value and only two 374 counters (out of 1024 counters in the row) have nonzero values. The nonzero values are triggered 375 by incomplete handshakes caused by occasional network errors. We select a counter with zero 376 value and another counter with nonzero values to show the CUSUM change-point detection 377 results. The results are depicted in Fig. 5 . Since the traffic is very low around midnight, the 378 result for this period is not shown for clarity.
379
In another experiment, the dataset with SYN flood attack packets is used. During the attack, 380 there are many more SYN packets than ACK packets. The counters corresponding to the hashed 381 values of the victim IP addresses grow substantially and hence become heavy counters. The 382 detection rates and false positive rates under different parameter settings are shown in Table 3 . 383 When N is set to 2 and a to 1, the CUSUM detection rate is the highest. When N and a are set 384 to other values, the detection rate is lower but remains almost the same for different settings. 385 The reason is that the destination table T d is refreshed periodically and change-point is checked 386 
U N C O R R E C T E D P R O O F
Throttling spoofed SYN flooding traffic at the source The CUSUM result for a counter keeping 0 value The CUSUM result for a non-zero counter shows the CUSUM results of two counters when an attack is launched. Note that the scale of the 393 vertical axis in Fig. 6(b) is much larger than that of Fig. 5(b) . 
Spoofing type classification
395
We use NS2 to simulate the random spoofing, subnet spoofing and fixed spoofing attack scenarios. 396 In the simulations, there are 10 server nodes and 1000 client nodes. One of the server nodes is 397 as shown in Fig. 7(a)-(c) .
U N C O R R E C T E D P R O O F
401
To classify the spoofing into one of the three types, we have to monitor the counter values in 
Comparison with other methods
414
Our work bears resemblance to IDR [4] and TOPS [1] , in the sense that these two methods also
415
detect DDoS attacks based on a hashing scheme.
416
IDR (Intrusion Detection Router) monitors the traffic passing through a router and detects
417
the occurrence of any exceptionally heavy volume of packets going to the same destination. 
422
There exist some crucial differences between IDR and our method. First, IDR does not extract 
434
There also exist some crucial differences between TOPS and our method. First, like IDR, TOPS 435 also does not perform feature extraction and hence incurs higher storage and hash updating costs. In our comparison, we use the DARPA off-line intrusion detection benchmark to evaluate the 443 detection performance of IDR, TOPS and our method under different parameter settings. We use 444 two datasets: one is free of any attack and the other contains SYN flooding attack packets.
445
Figure 8(a) shows the detection rates and false positive rates for different thresholds. For 446 IDR, parameter setting follows the recommendation in [4] , with the thresholds for all counters 447 being the same. From Fig. 8(a) , we can see that it is difficult for IDR to obtain high detection 448 rate and low false positive rate simultaneously. When the threshold is set somewhat low, some 449 packets sent to a popularly visited destination will be incorrectly recognized as suspicious ones. 450 On the other hand, if the threshold is set too high, IDR will fail to detect some relatively low 451 attacking traffic.
452
TOPS can hardly detect SYN flooding attacks near the victim side since the victim tries to 453 respond to all SYN requests, including malicious ones. Therefore, the ratio of incoming to outgo-454 ing traffic cannot indicate abnormal traffic characteristics. In our experiments, TOPS is deployed 455 near the attacking source and R min is used as the threshold according to the recommendation 456 in [1] . Figure 8(b) shows that TOPS, like IDR, cannot achieve high detection rate and low false 457 positive rate simultaneously. Adjusting R min can only improve one measure at the expense of the 458 other measure. Compared to IDR, TOPS can give more accurate results as the ratio of incoming 459 to outgoing traffic is a more reliable indicator for detection than the absolute counter values 460 P1: aaa 
values is highly non-uniform and hence the maximum counter value can be very large. As a 485 result, TOPS has a higher storage requirement than IDR and our method.
486
We also compare the computational cost of the three methods. A dataset containing about 487 200,000 entries is used for evaluation. Figure 9 (c) shows that our method has the lowest com-488 putational cost since it extracts DDoS features from the traffic and it does not need to update the 489 hash table frequently. Besides the hash operation, our method only requires simple increment 490 and decrement operations. IDR has the highest computational cost since it has to perform the 491 hash operation for every packet. While TOPS also performs the hash operation for every packet, 492 the hash function used is simple and hence the computational cost of TOPS is still low.
493
To summarize, our method can perform accurate detection yet with low storage and compu-494 tational costs. Moreover, it is relatively insensitive to the parameter setting.
495
6 Related work 496 Hash tables are high-performance data structures that can be used for efficient table lookup and 497 hence are particularly useful for many network packet processing applications. The Bloom filter 498 is a kind of space-efficient hash data structure, which was first proposed by Bloom [2] . It has 499 been used for network packet processing. For example, Song [16] presented a hash table data 500 structure and a lookup algorithm based on an extended Bloom filter which can support better 501 throughput for router applications using hash tables. Also, NetFlow [5] maintains a hash table of 502 connection records in DRAM and monitors the network traffic. The concept of multiple hashing, 503 which is similar to Bloom filter, is used to track large flows in the network traffic.
504
Hash tables have also been used for defending against DDoS attacks. Snoeren [15] presented 505 a technique based on hash table for IP traceback, which generates audit trails for the network 506 traffic so that the origin of an IP packet delivered by the network in the recent past can be traced. 507 Hash table has also been employed to look for imbalance between the incoming and outgoing 508 traffic flows to or from an IP address [1] . More recently, a router equipped with DDoS protection 509 capability called IDR [4] was proposed to detect DDoS attacks using a Bloom filter.
510
Change-point detection methods have been applied to DDoS detection due to their simplicity 511 and effectiveness. Wang et al. [17, 18] proposed a method for detecting SYN flood attacks at 512 leaf routers that connect end hosts to the Internet. Based on the observation that SYN and FIN 513 packets form pairs in normal network traffic, they proposed using a nonparametric CUSUM 514 method to accumulate the pairs. Luo and Chang [10] proposed a two-stage scheme to detect 515 the so-called pulsing DoS attacks. The first stage uses wavelet transform to extract the desired 516 frequency components of the traffic data and the second stage tries to detect change points in the 517 extracted components.
7 Conclusion
519
IP spoofing is a problem without any easy solution because it is inherent to the design of the 520 TCP/IP suite. Although IP spoofing is not an attack in itself, it is commonly used with real 521 TCP-based attacks by exploiting the characteristics of TCP/IP.
522
To defend against spoofed flooding attacks, we propose in this paper an efficient method that 523 can detect all three types of spoofing: random, subnet and fixed spoofing. Based on the Bloom 524 filter, we propose a storage-efficient data structure which only requires a fixed-length table 525 for recording relevant traffic information. A change-point detection method, CUSUM, is then 526 applied to detect abrupt changes in the traffic characteristics which correspond to the occurrence 527 P1: aaa 
531
There are some parameters in our method. Currently these parameters are set manually based 532 on experience. A future extension is to devise an automated scheme for setting or adapting these 533 parameters. Another interesting direction to pursue is to design adaptive hash functions that 534 maximize the utilization of the hash table entries and hence further reduce the false positive rate.
535
Moreover, we plan to evaluate our method in a reasonably large real network.
536
